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1  Introduction: The protection of property under a constitutional 
order
In South Africa, the right to “property” is a constitutionally guaranteed or 
fundamental right in terms of section 25 (“the property clause”) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”).
1
 The property clause in 
the Constitution is a two-pronged mechanism: it is designed to protect property 
against unconstitutional interference, and it guides the constitutionally-
mandated redistribution and reform process with the transformational goal of 
addressing centuries of racial and economic discrimination.
2
 
In terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, property is protected against 
arbitrary deprivations by law of general application. Expropriation of 
property, as subspecies of a deprivation,
3
 can only take place in terms of a 
law of general application, for a public purpose or in the public interest, and 
subject to the payment of compensation.
4
 Compensation must be “just and 
equitable” reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
 
* 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the suggestions and insights obtained from the anonymous referees. 
Any errors or omissions remain our own. 
1 
Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 33. See P Badenhorst “Expropriation of ‘old order’ mineral rights in South 
Africa: The Constitutional Court has its say (twice)” (2014) 4 Prop L Rev 53; P Badenhorst & N Olivier 
“The Agri South Africa Constitutional Court decision” (2014) 230 ARELJ 233-234. 
2 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar, & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 
521-522.
3 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 57.
4 
S 25(2)-(3) of the Constitution. 
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interests of the expropriated owner.
5
 In determining whether deprivation or 
expropriation has taken place, it is important to determine whether the subject 
of the deprivation or expropriation qualifies as constitutional property, and is 
thus worthy of constitutional protection. 
Property that is deemed worthy of constitutional protection is not 
necessarily limited to the characterisation of property in terms of private law. 
The Constitutional Court has provided a number of factors to assist in the 
determination of what should be constitutionally protected in terms of section 
25. However, until the decision in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Eastern Cape (“Shoprite decision”),
6
 the courts had, 
for the most part, not yet fully engaged with the meaning of constitutional 
property that went beyond the private-law understanding of property.
7
 In 
this case, the court was called upon to adjudicate a query as to whether a 
commercial trading licence, which permitted the selling of wine in a grocery 
store, fell within the ambit of the meaning of “property” in the Constitution. 
This case by no means provides an expansive and complete definition of what 
constitutes constitutional property, but, it widens the ambit of constitutional 
property considerably. 
The notion of constitutional property and its features, and the court’s 
approach to the determination of what constitutes constitutional property, will 
be examined in this article in respect of the three judgments handed down in 
the Shoprite decision.
8
 This article sets out the normative approach adopted by 
Froneman J, as compared to the private-law approach adopted by Madlanga J. 
It also canvasses the approach adopted by Moseneke DCJ, who argued that 
whether licences constituted constitutional property need not be examined, 
and instead put forward that a rationality enquiry should be undertaken. 
This article argues that the focus of the investigation should be on the 
rights that are lost when determining whether a right should be treated 
as constitutional property. The various approaches adopted by the three 
judgments referred to above, are evaluated in this light. Thereafter, this article 
attempts to distil the key features used by the court that may be useful for 
the determination of whether a right falls within the notion of constitutional 
property. 
2  Evolution of the concept of “constitutional property” in South 
African jurisprudence
Section 25(1) seeks to protect private property rights against governmental 
interference.
9
 Consequently, it embodies a negative protection of property.
10
 
5 
S 25(3). See further section 25(3) as to the factors that need to be taken into account in the balancing of 
the respective interests.
6 
2015 6 SA 125 (CC).
7 
Para 40.
8 
A discussion on the protection of property against deprivations or expropriations falls beyond the scope 
of this discussion.
9 
Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 34 (CC) para 4.
10 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 48.
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However, the right to property is not an absolute right in the constitutional order 
and may be subject to governmental interference to facilitate the achievement 
of social purposes.
11
 Where property rights are limited or deprived, it must 
first be established whether the property in question enjoys the status of 
constitutional property and thus the protection that the Constitution affords 
such property.
12
 
Save for the fact that property is not limited to land, section 25(1) of the 
Constitution does not define the notion of “property”.13 The first major decision 
concerning the property clause was First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service (“FNB decision”).
14
 In its 
judgment, the Constitutional Court declined to define property for purposes of 
section 25 comprehensively. The Court reasoned that it would be “practically 
impossible” and “judicially unwise” to furnish a comprehensive definition of 
property for purposes of section 25, given the early stage of development of 
the South African constitutional jurisprudence.
15
 
Despite the Constitutional Court’s initial reluctance to circumscribe the 
meaning of property, subsequent judgments have provided more clarity and 
insight into the content of the right. However, it has been accepted that a 
definition of constitutional property should not be too wide, thus rendering 
statutory regulation impracticable, nor should such definition be too narrow, 
rendering protection of property worthless.
16
 
Since the FNB decision, the Constitutional Court has recognised different 
forms of constitutional property. Both corporeal and incorporeal property 
enjoy protection.
17
 Real rights (property rights), such as ownership of 
movable
18
 or immovable
19
 (corporeal) property, mineral rights,
20
 usufructs
21
 
and the right to use land temporarily to remove gravel,
22
 have been recognised 
11 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 82; 
Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 33.
12 
AJ Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 85, 112, 187.
13 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 60.
14 
2002 4 SA 768 (CC).
15 
Para 51; H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the Bill of Rights” in T Naidu (ed) Bill of Rights 
Compendium 18 ed (RS 29 2006) 36.1.4. The absence of a definition was again confirmed in Law Society 
of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 83.
16 
Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 83.
17 
Para 83.
18 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 51, 54, 56. The 
Constitutional Court based its classification of ownership of a motor vehicle as constitutional property 
on the nature and object of ownership (para 51). The absence of, or limited use of the vehicles by First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) as credit provider, in whose favour 
ownership of the vehicles was reserved (para 54), its subjective interest as owner and the economic value 
its ownership (para 56) was rejected as criteria to determine the characteristic of the right.
19 
Para 51; Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 
(CC) para 33; Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 33.
20 
Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 50. 
21 
See National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 61.
22 
Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 54.
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as types of constitutional property.
23
 Other private-law rights (incorporeal 
property), such as intellectual property rights (a registered trademark),
24
 
and a right to the goodwill of a business
25
 have also been recognised as 
constitutional property. Some personal rights, such as a personal right arising 
from unjustified enrichment,26 and a claim for loss of earning capacity27 or 
the personal right to money deposited into a bank account
28
 have also been 
recognised as constitutional property.
29
 Public-law rights, such as state 
welfare payments and subsidies,
30
 are generally not regarded as constitutional 
property. 
Despite the above private-law style examples of constitutional property, the 
concept of constitutional property is fundamentally different from property as 
a private-law right. This is also true of the range of interests that qualify, and 
are protected, as private-law rights.
31
 As a point of departure, an interest or 
right should be regarded as constitutional property if it constitutes a concrete 
asset and has “vested in or been acquired by the holder according to normal 
law”.
32
 As will be indicated in our discussion below, the consideration of what 
constitutes constitutional property goes beyond this formulation of property.
3  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, 
Eastern Cape 
Shoprite Checkers is a well-known supermarket chain in South Africa. 
In terms of a pre-existing legislative framework (the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 
(“Liquor Act”)), it was licenced to sell wine with food in all of its grocery 
stores in the Eastern Cape. In terms of the new Eastern Cape Liquor Act 10 of 
2003 (“Eastern Cape Liquor Act”), the holder of a grocer’s wine licence is (a) 
allowed to continue to sell wine with food at the same premises for a period of 
ten years; and (b) entitled, after five years, to apply for a liquor licence to sell 
23 
According to Van der Walt, all limited real rights, including servitudes, real security rights and registered 
long term leases and mineral rights should be recognised as constitutional property. Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 140.
24 
Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom 
of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 SA 144 (CC) para 17. See further Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 143, 148-150.
25 
Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh 2007 6 SA 350 (CC). See also Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 151.
26 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 61. Van der Westhuizen J reasoned that 
such recognition is in line with the recognition of personal rights as constitutional property in other 
jurisdictions (para 63). Van der Westhuizen J also referred to the view of the court a quo that an enrichment 
claim counted as an asset in one’s estate or patrimony, has monetary value and could be disposed of and 
transferred to another person.
27 
It was only assumed to be the case in Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 1 SA 400 
(CC) para 84.
28 
Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport 2015 10 BCLR 1158 (CC) para 16. See also Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law 151.
29 
See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 141-143, 153.
30 
See 162. In Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 9 
BCLR 1235 (Tk) it was noted that constitutional property for purposes of section 28 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”) was probably wide enough to 
include a state subsidy. See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 167-168.
31 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 101-102, 107.
32 
184.
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all kinds of liquor at separate premises.
33
 Shoprite elected not to apply for the 
conversion of its grocer’s wine licences, resulting in the lapsing of the licences 
and the closure of the table-wine sections in its affected stores.
34
 
Shoprite contended that the change of the regulatory regime amounted to 
arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
This argument was accepted by the court a quo. When the High Court’s 
finding of unconstitutionality was referred to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation, Shoprite argued that the licences constituted constitutional 
property because they had monetary value, could be disposed of and 
transferred, and constituted an asset in the holder’s estate.
35
 The respondents 
contended that the liquor licences became converted rights
36
 and neither 
licence nor right was property for purposes of section 25.
37
 Whether a 
deprivation took place, and if so, whether it was arbitrary, was contested by 
the parties.
38
A primary consideration that the court had to address was thus whether the 
commercial trading licence fell within the scope of the term “property” as 
set out by the Constitution.
39
 Froneman J formulated the three constitutional 
issues as follows: 
(a) “Does the entitlement to commercial trade under state licence or regulation amount to property 
under s 25?
(b) If it does, do the impugned provisions of the Eastern Cape Act deprive holders of their property? 
(c) If yes, is that deprivation arbitrary?”
40
Three judgments were handed down by Froneman J (Cameron J, Jappie JA 
and Nkabinde J concurring), Madlanga J (Tshiqi AJ concurring) and Moseneke 
DCJ (Mogoeng CJ, Khampepe J, Molemela AJ and Theron AJ concurring). 
The majority of the Constitutional Court, in the judgments of Froneman J 
and Madlanga J,
41
 held that a grocer’s wine licence is property under section 
25 of the Constitution and that Shoprite was deprived of this property in 
terms of the provisions of the Eastern Cape Liquor Act. Moseneke DCJ,
42
 
in his minority judgment, disagreed with the finding that the grocer’s wine 
licences constituted constitutional property.
43
 Froneman J and Moseneke DCJ 
(majority with this issue) held that the deprivation was not arbitrary, whilst 
Madlanga J dissented on the matter of arbitrariness.
44
 The overall effect of the 
judgments was that the High Court’s declaration of unconstitutionality could 
33 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) paras 
2, 8.
34 
Para 100.
35 
Para 18.
36 
Para 27.
37 
Para 25.
38 
See paras 20-21 and 27-28 respectively.
39 
Para 1.
40 
Para 6.
41 
Para 133.
42 
Mogoeng CJ, Khampepe J, Molemela AJ and Theron AJ concurring.
43 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 
95.
44 
See para 5.
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not be confirmed: there was no arbitrary deprivation of property, and lapsing 
of the right was consistent with the Constitution.
45
 
3 1 The majority judgments in the Shoprite decision
Below, the judgments of Froneman J and Madlanga J are set out in more 
detail.
3 1 1 Froneman J
Froneman J, in his majority judgment, set the scene for the conflicting 
judgments on the notion of property:
“The question of property is fiercely contested in South African society. There is, as yet, little common 
ground on how we conceive of property under s 25 of the Constitution, why we should do so, and 
what purpose the protection of property should serve. This exposes a potential fault line that may 
threaten our constitutional project.”
46
In grappling with the conception of constitutional property against this 
backdrop, the court stated that the “evolving conversation” about the notion 
of property should continue “within the framework of values and individual 
rights in the Constitution”.
47
 This sentiment is key to Froneman J’s judgment, 
which adopts an explicitly normative approach towards the interpretation of 
the property clause.
The court set out the reasons for the contested nature of the protection of 
property, explaining them with reference to the history of apartheid, where 
exclusive individual entitlements were the focus of the pre-constitutional 
notion of property. Secondly, apartheid laws and policies ensured the 
“dispossession of what indigenous people held, and its transfer to the 
colonisers in the form of land and other property, protected by an economic 
system that ensured the continued deprivation of those benefits on racial and 
class lines”.
48
 As a consequence of this history, the effects of which are still 
experienced, the realisation of the constitutional values of a society based on 
“human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms”
49
 is hindered. This hindrance can be attributed to the 
dichotomy that exists between the previously advantaged, who fear losing 
what they have, and the previously disadvantaged, who fear that equitable 
redistribution will not be realised.
50
 The property clause is thus treated with 
suspicion, exacerbated and informed by different perspectives and opposite 
ideological extremes.
51
 
According to Froneman J, the contrasting conceptions can only be 
addressed by seeking “our own constitutional conception of property within 
45 
See paras 24, 88, 91.
46 
Para 4.
47 
Para 4.
48 
Para 34.
49 
S 1(a) of the Constitution. 
50 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 
34.
51 
Para 35.
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the normative framework of the fundamental values and individual rights in 
the Constitution”.
52
 He also stated that the extent of constitutional protection 
that property should enjoy would be dependent on not only the nature of the 
constitutional property interest, but also the “core purpose” of the interest in 
question.
53
Froneman J was of the view that it had become necessary to pursue the 
investigation into what constituted constitutional property beyond the FNB 
decision. He argued that, following this decision, the query into the existence 
of constitutional property was context-dependent and thus variable. To ensure 
consistency between these assessments, Froneman J identified the underlying 
reasons or the normative basis for the determination of constitutional 
property.
54
 In the process, he set out some of the guidelines for the proper 
conceptualisation of constitutional property, in addition to those earlier 
identified in the FNB decision.55 The building blocks mentioned by Froneman 
J can be extracted and summarised as follows:
(a) a conception and determination of constitutional property has to be 
derived from the Constitution and accord with the objective normative 
values and founding values of the Constitution;
56
 
(b) during the extension of the boundaries of property, the fundamental 
values of dignity, equality and freedom play a central role;
57
(c) each individual case must be adjudged within the constitutional frame-
work,
58
 and the enquiry must be objective;
59
 
(d) it would be retrogressive to rely on pre-constitutional notions of vesting 
to determine the ambit of property that needs to be protected;
60
(e) section 25 contains other potential constitutional resources that are 
worthy of protection;
61
(f) determination of constitutional property should be pushed and extended 
beyond the private-law boundaries or notions of property to extend the 
boundaries of constitutional protection;
62
(g) the entitlement to commercial trade under a state licence or regulation 
does not fit comfortably within the private-law notions of property, 
which only recognises rights once they are vested rights;
63
52 
Para 36; see also para 46.
53 
Para 36.
54 
Para 39.
55 
Para 48, namely: 
 
  “(i) the protection of property as an individual right is not absolute but subject to societal considerations; 
(ii) that property should also serve the public good is an idea by no means foreign to pre-constitutional 
property concepts; and (iii) neither the subjective interest of the owner in the thing owned, nor the 
economic value of the right of ownership, can determine the characterisation of the right.” 
 
(per Froneman J).
56 
Paras 39 and 44.
57 
Para 46.
58 
Para 39.
59 
Para 64.
60 
Para 59.
61 
For examples of these resources, see paras 42-43.
62 
See paras 40 and 46.
63 
See paras 41-59.
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(h) private-law notions of property should still be constitutionally 
scrutinised;
64
(i) a conception of property is necessitated which allows individual self-
fulfilment in the holding of property as well the social obligation not to 
harm the public good;
65
(j) protection of property need not to be premised on an economic theory, 
which holds that the most important purpose of property has to be wealth 
or individual satisfaction; and
66
(k) when confronted with legal transition, “the entitlements of the past do not 
necessarily warrant protection in perpetuity, provided that appropriate 
and reasonable transitional provisions are made”.
67
Froneman J thus concluded that constitutional property must be expanded 
beyond the private-law notions of property, finding that the holding of a 
grocer’s wine licence constitutes property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.
68
 Froneman J reasoned that the public-law nature of state grants, 
such as social and welfare grants, should not be used as an argument to deny 
them protection as property.
69
 The public-law origin of a licence was also 
recognised by virtue of it being a state grant.
70
 
To arrive at this outcome, namely that a liquor licence can be considered 
as constitutional property, Froneman J made a number of observations. He 
defined a liquor licence as “an entitlement to do business that would otherwise 
have been unlawful”.
71
 In terms of private-law theory, an entitlement denotes 
the content of the right. Froneman J identifies the encompassing right itself 
as a “personal legal claim”
72
 or “an enforceable personal incorporeal right”.
73
 
However, as argued below, this does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
remedy and the right.
74
Notwithstanding the fact that the origin of the right in question was public, a 
distinction should still be drawn between (a) the right itself, which is by nature 
incorporeal,
75
 (b) the entitlements as the content of a right, and (c) a remedy 
(claim) by virtue of a right. A personal right is at hand if the legal object of the 
right is the rendering of a performance.
76
 A grocer’s wine licence (personal 
right) has as its content the entitlement to carry on the business of selling wine 
and other groceries on the same premises. Performance by the state involves 
allowing the licensee to carry on such business.
64 
See para 46.
65 
Para 61.
66 
See paras 52-55. 
67 
Para 51.
68 
Para 70.
69 
Para 58.
70 
Para 58.
71 
Para 58.
72 
Para 67.
73 
Para 68.
74 
See the text to n 153 below.
75 
In short, a corporeal right as opposite of an incorporeal right is nonsensical.
76 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 9.
THE NOTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY IN SA 33
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
The following features of these personal rights, which are statutorily 
created and protected, are listed by the court, namely that the rights are: 
(a)  “clearly definable and identifiable by persons other than the holder”;77 
(b)  recognised not only upon vesting;
78
 
(c)  transferable, subject to approval by the licensing authority; 
(d)  “sufficiently permanent, in the sense that the holder is, in terms of 
administrative law, protected against arbitrary revocation by the issuing 
authority”; 
(e)  valuable;
79
 
(f)  only capable of being withdrawn under prescribed conditions; and 
(g)  enforceable, either (i) indefinitely (under the Liquor Act) or (ii) for a 
determined period (under the Eastern Cape Act).
80
 
Froneman J conceded that his approach, namely to look at the nature of 
the right, its content and features, is “close to recognition on conventional 
private-law grounds”.
81
 
However, the majority of the focus in Froneman J’s judgment was to link 
the concept of constitutional property with other values and rights in the 
Constitution. He set out the reasons why constitutional property should not 
be confined to “private-law notions of property” as this could both exclude 
constitutional entitlements worthy of protection as property, and shield 
traditional concepts of property from constitutional scrutiny.
82
 Instead, the 
notion of constitutional property must accord with the founding values of 
the Constitution, which includes the values of dignity, freedom and equality. 
As the court pointed out, a natural person would find it easier to persuade 
the court that a “grocer’s wine licence granted by the state enabled [them] 
to conduct a business vocation of [their] choice that was essential to [their] 
living a life of dignity”.
83
 However, the enquiry that the court must undertake 
is not a subjective one, taking into account that the holder of the right is not 
a natural person. Instead, the enquiry is objective: the legislation complained 
of may impact other holders of rights where the link between the rights 
and dignity are clearer, such as in the case of a natural person.
84
 Further, 
Froneman J argued, there is nothing in the legislation preventing a “licence of 
this kind” from being held by a “person who needs it to live a life of individual 
self-fulfilment and reciprocal dignity to others”.85 In the main, therefore, 
Froneman J’s approach was to link the state-granted licence to the concept of 
dignity, and more concretely, the right to choose one’s own vocation. Having 
77 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 
68. 
78 
See para 59. It seems as if recognition should be extended to instances where the applicant had a legitimate 
expectation in the outcome of the decision.
79 
Para 68. Commercial value is, however, not required (para 69).
80 
Para 67.
81 
Para 68.
82 
Para 46.
83 
Para 64.
84 
Para 61.
85 
Para 66.
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done so for all persons who could be affected by the legislation, both natural 
and legal, he concluded that licences are worthy of constitutional protection.
3 1 2  Madlanga J
Standing in stark contrast to the predominantly normative approach adopted 
by Froneman J, Madlanga J adopted an approach anchored more heavily in 
private law. Madlanga J also outlined the historical disadvantage of black 
people in South Africa, particularly the dispossession of land, and the ongoing 
detrimental effects that are yet to be addressed, highlighting that our society 
was, and continues to be, “painfully unequal”. As required by section 25 of 
the Constitution, a balance must be struck between the protection of existing 
property interests and the promotion of the public interests pursuant to the 
objectives of transforming our society, including the current property regime. 
Though the protection of property interests cannot derail the transformative 
vision of the Constitution, Madlanga J stated that if an interest qualifies as 
constitutional property, one “should not shy away [from] declaring it to be 
so”.
86
Madlanga J undertook an analysis of the features or rights to determine 
whether property is constitutional property through the lens of private law. 
He reiterated that ownership and incorporeal property enjoy constitutional 
protection.
87
 Madlanga J also acknowledged that what constitutes property 
beyond these easily identifiable private-law types is a “vexed question”.88 
Moreover, in seeking a definition of property, the courts should guard against 
a definition that is “too wide to make legislative regulation impracticable”, 
whilst ensuring that said definition is similarly “not too narrow to render the 
protection of property of little worth”.
89
Going beyond the recognised forms of private-law rights in attempting to 
answer the problem at hand, Madlanga J compared a grocer’s wine licence 
with an enrichment claim, which was recognised as a form of constitutional 
property in National Credit Regulator v Opperman (“Opperman decision”).
90
 
In drawing a comparison between the two rights, Madlanga J stated that 
an enrichment claim is a personal right that is only enforceable against a 
specific party, is tenuous in nature, and devoid of value, unless proven in 
court.
91
 A grocer’s wine licence was perceived as a right (“something in 
hand”), which entitles its holder to sell wine under specified circumstances, 
may endure indefinitely, may only be suspended or cancelled in accordance 
with the requirements of just administrative action, has objective commercial 
86 
Para 138.
87 
See paras 140-142.
88 
Para 141.
89 
Para 141.
90 
2013 2 SA 1 (CC). For commentary on this decision, see EJ Marais “The Constitutionality of Section 
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& Others” (2014) 131 SALJ 215-233.
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value under prescribed circumstances,
92
 is transferable against valuable con- 
sideration, subject to sanction by the authorities, constitutes an asset in 
an estate and enhances the value of its holder.
93
 Madlanga J viewed the 
enrichment action as “somewhat tenuous” and even further removed from a 
“readily acceptable property” right.
94
 Given that an enrichment action was 
recognised as constitutional property, a grocer’s wine licence should also 
be capable of recognition as property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.
95
 
Commenting on the approach adopted by Froneman J, Madlanga J stressed 
that the right to property is a stand-alone right, which need not ride on the 
coat-tails of other fundamental rights such as human dignity, freedom of 
trade, occupation and profession.
96
 According to Madlanga J, the judgment of 
Froneman J “waters down the potency of the right to property” by relying too 
heavily on the aforementioned rights.
97
 He reasoned further that the licence 
had all the hallmarks of property; consequently, its existence as a licence was 
not a bar to its characterisation as constitutional property.
98
 This statement is 
not necessarily determinative or precedent-setting for all licences, however, 
as Madlanga J stated obiter that some licences may lack some of the necessary 
features of constitutional property.
99
 
Madlanga J also criticised Froneman J’s finding that the deprivation 
of property was minor, and further, that it did not amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation.
100
 Responding to the concerns outlined by Moseneke DCJ, 
Madlanga J indicated that the termination of licences would not necessarily 
amount to expropriation of property due to the difficulty of proving an 
expropriation after the Constitutional Court’s decision in Agri South Africa 
v Minister of Minerals and Energy
101
 (“Agri decision”).
102
 Thus, future 
determinations regarding licences, and whether they constitute constitutional 
92 
Which was distinguished from subjective commercial value (held to be of insignificant value in the 
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property in terms of section 25(1), should be reviewed on a case-by-case 
basis.
103
3 2 The minority view in the Shoprite decision
Moseneke DCJ argued that it was unnecessary to characterise the licence 
as constitutional property because the same outcome could be achieved if the 
challenged provisions were tested for rationality.
104
 Rationality is determined 
by asking “whether the provisions pursue a legitimate government purpose, 
and if so, whether the statutory means resorted to are arbitrary or reveal naked 
preference or another illogical or irrational trait”.
105
 Moseneke DCJ was of 
the opinion that such a rationality enquiry would, in process and substance, 
be the same as the arbitrariness enquiry required by section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.
106
This notwithstanding, Moseneke DCJ, upon evaluating the “difficult 
and fluid question”107 as to whether the licence constitutes property in the 
hands of its holder, argued that the licences do not fall within the ambit of 
constitutional property.
108
 Agreeing with the respondents in the matter, 
Moseneke DCJ distinguished between state grants, generally, and liquor 
licences, in particular, “given the special nature of the subject of regulation, 
namely liquor”.
109
 The focus of his enquiry was thus only on state grants in 
the form of liquor licences. 
In his assessment, Moseneke DCJ required section 25 of the Constitution to 
be considered against the backdrop of the history of South Africa in relation 
to the notions of property in the property clause.
110
 A further consideration is 
the absence of a comprehensive definition of property in the Constitution,111 
and the fact that various real rights (under the common law and customary 
law),
112
 and some personal rights,
113
 have been recognised by the courts as 
property. Furthermore, additional considerations to be taken into account are 
that the inherent nature of a right must contain characteristics of property
114
 
and the importance of determining whether vesting of a right has taken 
place.
115 Moseneke DCJ pointed out the difficulty of conflicting international 
jurisprudence as to whether the so-called new forms of property (such as 
103 
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104 
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government largesse) should be recognised as property.
116
 The constitutional 
scheme is also a relevant consideration
117
 as well as the fact that not every 
conceivable interest, with or without commercial value, needs to be converted 
into protectable property.
118
 In the context of commercial value, Moseneke 
DCJ stated that it was not necessary to adopt a wide approach to the property 
clause such that all interests are recognised as protectable property, as 
a broad range of socio-economic rights are protected by our Constitution. 
Furthermore, laws and governmental conduct are open to judicial scrutiny as 
well as protection in terms of administrative justice.
119
 
In his assessment, Moseneke DCJ offered two possibilities as to the 
object of the deprivation.
120 In the first instance, the object of loss could be 
characterised as the “entitlement and business opportunity to sell table wine 
in its supermarkets alongside other groceries”
121
 or “a preferred business 
opportunity or model”.
122
 Alternatively, Moseneke DCJ argued that the liquor 
licence as a right (excluding other state grants),
123
 namely an incorporeal right, 
could be the object of deprivation. 
Upon consideration, Moseneke DCJ held that the object of loss is as first 
described, namely, “a preferred business opportunity or model”. In this 
instance, Shoprite had not lost the ability to sell liquor altogether; upon 
application for a liquor licence, it would be entitled to sell liquor again, but 
at a separate premises and not alongside groceries.
124
 What it had lost was a 
“business strategy and model that it prefers and cherishes”.
125
 In respect of 
this finding, he concluded that “a mere preference of a business model is not 
“property” that requires protection against arbitrary deprivation as foreseen 
in section 25(1) of the Constitution”.
126
 
A licence is described as “a bare permission to do something that would 
otherwise be unlawful”.
127
 Liquor licences have a number of attributes: 
they are normally issued to overcome a statutory prohibition,
128
 they 
remain in force for an indefinite duration129 or may be time bound130 once 
they are granted, they are never absolute and often subject to conditions,
131
 
they may be suspended or withdrawn administratively by the licencing 
authority under specified and limited circumstances,132 they are transferable 
116 
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117 
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119 
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subject to approval being obtained,
133 and they could lapse upon specified 
circumstances.
134
 These are typical features of a right (as object) and not of an 
entitlement or opportunity (as object). 
Moseneke DCJ reasoned that the entitlement to commercial trade 
under a state licence does not fit comfortably with the constitutional notion 
of property.
135
 Furthermore, and contrary to the judgment of Froneman J, 
Moseneke DCJ required vesting of a right prior to its recognition as 
constitutional property.
136
 A liquor licence, he argued, does not vest in its 
holder under the statutory scheme.
137
 In addition, a liquor licence is derived 
from an act of regulation and open to legitimate regulation.
138
 Finally, 
Moseneke DCJ stated that the enquiry about arbitrary deprivation is, in 
substance, not different from the enquiry into the rationality of the impugned 
statute.
139
 
Moseneke DCJ also directly disagreed with Froneman J’s primary approach, 
which was to evaluate whether the right fell within the ambit of constitutional 
property by looking at the impact of the licences on other rights, such as 
dignity. Finding that the “core nature of a liquor licence is permission”, he 
stated that “subjective interests like economic and commercial value, let alone 
human dignity and vocation of choice and liberty, are of little assistance in 
themselves”.
140
Moseneke DCJ placed less emphasis on the threshold question of 
“property”,
141 namely whether the property can be classified as constitutional 
property, and instead elevated the scrutiny to the level of an arbitrary 
deprivation analysis. Aside from his reasoning that the same outcome could 
be achieved by testing the rationality of the impugned statute, Moseneke 
DCJ argued that, unlike other jurisdictions, the remedies in South African 
administrative law were sufficiently wide that the constitutional property 
clause did not have to be overburdened as a judicial mechanism in these 
circumstances.
142
 To support this approach, Moseneke DCJ argued that a 
construction of constitutional property that included licences would be too 
wide and make regulation difficult due to the increase in possible deprivations 
and expropriations.
143
 Moseneke DCJ was wary of creating the untenable 
situation where any regulatory regime that affects licences would result in 
a constitutional challenge under section 25, thus “impermissibly limit[ing]” 
legislative competence.
144
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4  Commentary
The word “property” is generally used in the sense of a legal object, such 
as land, a right or a legal relationship.
145
 Whilst it is, for instance, relatively 
easy to identify property as an object (for example, the common-law notion 
of a thing as identified with reference to its features),146 the identification of 
property as a right is more difficult. If one adheres to the doctrine of rights, 
which defines rights with reference to objects, it is also relatively easy to do so. 
As such, any property analysis in private law is actually a rights analysis. As 
a starting point, the same submission is put forward in respect of the analysis 
and identification of constitutional property. The first stage of the enquiry into 
what constitutes constitutional property is thus the determination of the rights 
in question. In the Shoprite decision, these are the statutory rights afforded by 
the holding of the licence. The content of the right was the entitlement to carry 
on the business of selling wine and other groceries on the same premises.
Per the court’s approach in the Shoprite decision, the second stage of the 
enquiry is as follows: contextualise and evaluate the undefined notion of 
constitutional property within the normative framework of the fundamental 
values and individual rights in the Constitution, with an awareness of the 
South African history of dispossession of property prior to the constitutional 
era.
147
 This is clear from the majority and minority judgments in the Shoprite 
decision.
148
 
In the post-constitutional order, and since the FNB decision, the private-
law notions of property and interests may serve as a point of departure in 
the determination of what constitutes constitutional property. However, the 
concept of, and range of interests qualifying as constitutional property, and 
the reasons for constitutional protection, are fundamentally different from the 
recognition of property as a private-law right. As indicated by Froneman J,
149
 
possible forms of constitutional property do not always align comfortably 
with private-law notions of property. This has given rise to the need to expand 
the concept of constitutional property beyond the private-law boundaries 
and constraints that ordinarily dominate the discourse on property.
150
 
Alternatively, in terms of Moseneke DCJ’s approach, the grant of statutory 
licences should rather be treated as an administrative act
151
 protected by the 
right to administrative justice, rather than the constitutional property clause. 
The characterisation of this exercise of determining what is constitutional 
property as being focused on the property itself is misleading. Instead, the 
focus of the investigation should be on the rights that are lost. Deprivation or 
expropriation is about the regulation of the exercise of rights or the taking of 
145 
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those rights.
152
 This does not mean that the all-important social and historical 
context must not be taken into account. However, if the object of the search 
is correctly identified as a right, it no longer becomes necessary to work with 
private-law notions of property or to extend the boundaries of private-law 
notions. The source of the right may be found in public or private law. The 
notion of a right is well developed in private law and, to some extent, in public 
law as well. 
An understanding of the notion of a right during the determination of 
constitutional property is important, whether one views the issue from a 
private or public law perspective. As indicated before, a distinction must be 
drawn between rights, entitlements as the content of a right, and remedies.
153
 
It is submitted that neither Froneman J nor Moseneke DCJ focused sufficiently 
on the right, as the object of deprivation. As indicated before, Froneman J 
does not clearly distinguish between a remedy, a personal legal claim, and a 
right (an enforceable personal incorporeal right). For purposes of determining 
whether a deprivation of property occurred, the ability to sell table wine 
was characterised by Moseneke DCJ as the object of deprivation and not the 
right to do so.
154
 Moseneke DCJ, whilst attempting to focus on the object of 
deprivation, hovered between a conception of the object as a (i) “business 
opportunity or model”, which was the incorrect object as it does not amount 
to a right in private or public law, and (ii) a statutory right or licence, which 
was the correct object of deprivation.
155
 Moseneke DCJ also reasoned that a 
grocer’s wine licence is derived from the fact of regulation. It is true that a 
licence is granted by statute, but it remains a personal right in nature, which is 
enforceable against the state. Similarly, Madlanga J, referred to the Opperman 
decision regarding an enrichment claim, which is by its nature a remedy, as 
a personal right.
156
 However, a personal right is, strictly speaking, acquired 
by virtue of the fact that undue enrichment took place, which provides the 
remedy, namely a specific enrichment action. A civil-law obligation157 arises 
by contract, delict or unjustified enrichment. The personal right by virtue of 
unjustified enrichment (and not the remedy) exhibits the features identified by 
Madlanga J.
If a right is focused upon during the enquiry, the features of a right may 
then be examined as the logical next step - a step that was undertaken by 
the court. Both the majority and minority decisions focused on the different 
features of a right to determine whether the object or interest qualifies as 
property. The presence or absence of certain features, which are set out below, 
can be taken into account during the determination of whether such rights 
are constitutional property. Although the list is not definitive, the presence of 
most of the features point towards the recognition of the right as constitutional 
152 
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153 
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property. Each of the judgments in the Shoprite case investigated a different 
array of the features set out below, coming to different conclusions as to their 
existence and the extent to which they influenced the recognition of the right 
as constitutional property.
The first feature that may indicate the recognition of a right as constitutional 
property considers the acquisition and vesting of rights, the relevance of which 
is well-known in private law.
158
 However, the court in the Shoprite decision 
took markedly different approaches to this feature. Froneman J indicated that 
constitutional property might exist even in circumstances where vesting has 
not yet taken place.
159
 Madlanga J seems to have accepted that vesting of the 
licence did take place, and such vesting supported his view that the licence 
was constitutional property.
160
 Moseneke DCJ required vesting of the right 
and used the absence of such vesting, in his opinion, to justify his finding 
about the absence of constitutional property.
161
 
With reference to the feature of vesting, it is conceded that the moment of 
vesting of a right is difficult to determine at times. The reason for this difficulty 
stems from the fact that the nature of the right is usually not first determined. 
For instance, it was unclear when the vesting of a (statutory) prospecting right 
occurred in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
28 of 2002 (“MPRDA”). In Meepo v Kotze,
162
 it was held that the grant of 
a prospecting right takes place by contract, once the terms and conditions 
had been determined and communicated by the Deputy Director-General: 
Mineral Development to an applicant for his acceptance.
163
 In Minister of 
Mineral Resources v Mawetse (SA) Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd
164
 (“Mawetse 
decision”), the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the grant of a prospecting 
right by the Deputy Director-General: Mineral Development takes place by 
an authoritative unilateral administrative act upon the date that the grantor 
approves the Regional Manager’s recommendation to grant a prospecting 
right.
165
 
Both these decisions may be correct and are reconcilable: a public-law right 
is vested at the times indicated in the Mawetse decision whilst, the private-
law right, namely a personal right, is vested upon conclusion of the contract. 
Upon registration of the prospecting right, as required by the MPRDA in the 
Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office, another private-law right 
is acquired, namely a real right.
166 The three rights identified have vested at 
three distinct moments in time. To know whether vesting has taken place, the 
right, and its nature, needs to be clarified first. 
158 
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The second feature that can be observed is the identifiability and definability 
of the right. A right that cannot be identified, or is incapable of definition, 
cannot be property. This feature is in line with the South African property law 
requirement that an object has to constitute an independent entity in law to 
qualify as a thing.
167 Froneman J specifically stated that the “right to sell liquor 
is thus clearly definable and identifiable by persons other than the holder”.168
The nature of the right is the third feature that may inform the enquiry 
into whether a right is constitutional property. Whether the right is by nature 
private or public is relevant, as private-law rights have more readily been 
recognised as constitutional property by the courts, as expressly stated by 
the court in the Shoprite decision.
169
 Madlanga J used a private-law right 
(namely, the personal right by virtue of unjustified enrichment) as a yardstick 
to justify his finding that a grocer’s wine licence constitutes property.170 
Froneman J even reasoned that the nature of a grocer’s licence - a public-law 
right - should not be used to deny finding that a grocer’s licence constitutes 
constitutional property.
171
 By contrast, the public-law nature of the licence 
played a significant role in Moseneke DCJ’s finding that the licence did not 
constitute property.
172
The content of the right is the fourth feature identified, as a right has as its 
content certain entitlements. The more extensive these entitlements are, the 
more likely it would amount to the vesting of an interest in the holder of the 
right. The corollary is that the more a right is restricted, the less entitlements 
there are likely to be. As a result, the inherent or imposed limitations on the 
exercise of the right must also be taken into account. All three judges focused 
on the content of the right of the grocer to sell wine. As stated above,
173
 in the 
context of the Shoprite decision, it is contended that the correct conception of 
what constituted the content of the right was the entitlement to carry on the 
business of selling wine and other groceries on the same premises.
The fifth feature that can be evaluated is the objective value of the right, 
which is also relevant when identifying a thing or property
174
 and a patrimonial 
right in private law. Froneman J, in discussing the right, lists “value” as one of 
the features of the liquor licence.
175
 However, as set out by the court, not only 
in the Shoprite decision, but also in Agri and FNB, the commercial value of the 
right is not determinative of whether it constitutes constitutional property.
176
 
Instead, the enquiry should focus on the value of the purpose (“object”) of the 
167 
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right and not its commercial value.
177
 It is submitted that one could work with 
the objective value of a right as one of various factors. This point was also 
made by Madlanga J, who stated that “[o]bjective commercial value definitely 
does come into the equation when determining whether the right in issue is 
property”.
178
The enforceability of a right is also a relevant feature: if a right is 
unenforceable against others, it would not qualify as a right or constitutional 
property. Enforceability of a right against others (society), or the so-called in 
rem operation, is a universal feature of a property right.
179
 Stated differently, 
the ability of the right holder to exclude others from interfering with the 
exercise of the right is an important feature of property.
180
 It is submitted that 
the feature of excludability afforded by a right should also be emphasised more 
in the South African context
181 as it fits well with the subject-third parties’ 
relationship of a subjective right. In this case, the right was characterised as 
enforceable by Froneman J.
182
 
Two other relevant features include the ability of the right to be transferred, 
as well as the suspension or termination of the right under specified 
circumstances.
183
 The transferability of a right may lead to a very wide 
definition of property, given that many rights, including those not necessarily 
falling within the traditional concept of “property” may also be transferable. 
These other transferable rights, namely, personal rights and intellectual 
property rights, however, also qualify as constitutional property. In respect 
of these features, Moseneke DCJ also reasoned that they contribute towards a 
finding that the licence is not constitutional property: he stated that “licenses 
are subject to administrative withdrawal and change … they are also not freely 
transferable”.
184
 Madlanga J, by contrast, reasoned, “though [the licence] may 
be suspended or cancelled, that may not be done at whim”, and further, that 
the licence is transferable, though only with approval from the authorities.
185
The final feature discussed is the ability of a right to form an asset in the 
estate of the holder of the right. In support of their argument that the licence 
was constitutional property, Shoprite submitted that the right constituted 
an “asset in the holder’s estate”.
186
 The court did not directly engage with 
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this point, although Madlanga J made reference to “asset[s] of value” in his 
discussion of the objective commercial value of the licence.
187
5  Conclusion
Since the provisional steps taken by the court in the FNB decision, different 
rights have been recognised as constitutional property. The notion has been 
widened to include public-law rights, such as a grocer’s licence to sell liquor. 
The court has appropriately acknowledged that the evolving conversation 
surrounding what constitutes constitutional property should continue. The 
discovery and declaration of new forms of constitutional property is inevitable.
When rights are scrutinised to determine whether they qualify as 
constitutional property, and are thus worthy of constitutional protection, 
the normative standards set out by the Constitution must be met. In this 
determination of what constitutes constitutional property, the historical 
context of ownership and land distribution as a consequence of apartheid 
must be borne in mind, as well as the transformative visions and values of 
the Constitution. This necessarily requires an approach that is both backward 
and forward-looking: the building blocks of properly conceptualised property, 
and the milieu of legal reality of the past and the present, provide assistance 
for this analysis. The presence or absence of established features of a right, 
namely a claim of a subject to an object with reference to others, should be 
applied to classify the new forms of constitutional property. Upon examining 
new forms of constitutional property, one may still rely on the private-law 
theory of rights.
It is submitted that the various approaches of identifying property, be they 
old, new, popular, or fancy, must focus on the right in question. A right either 
exists or not, has certain features, and the exercise thereof can be regulated or 
limited, such as deprivation, or taken away altogether, such as expropriation. 
Property analysis has always been, and will always be, a rights-analysis. Even 
within the broad notion of property in the English common law, where rights, 
interests and title are used indiscriminately as synonyms and rights-analyses 
are limited, Blackstone started his famous definition of property with the 
words: 
“[T]he right of property [is the] sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises 
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe”
188
 [our emphasis]. 
Despite the fact that the Shoprite decision required the court to look at 
constitutional property in the context of public rights, the Constitutional 
Court necessarily undertook a rights-analysis.
Though all three judgments undertook a rights-analysis, their respective 
approaches were markedly different. As a result, the Shoprite decision provides 
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W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England II (1765–1769) ch 1. For commentary on 
Blackstone’s intentions regarding this statement, see H Dagan & M Heller “The Liberal Commons” 
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little certainty regarding the approach to be adopted when determining the 
scope and ambit of the constitutional concept of property, given the contrasting 
approaches adopted by Froneman J and Madlanga J in this respect. Froneman J 
approached the enquiry by taking normative considerations into account, 
anchoring the notion of constitutional property to other constitutional rights 
and values, such as dignity. By contrast, Madlanga J focused on private-law 
considerations to inform his decision, arguing that the constitutional property 
clause was a stand-alone right. Neither of these approaches attracted the 
support of a majority of the court, and accordingly, either may be adopted 
in future enquiries as to whether a right constitutes constitutional property. 
In addition, the features that the court considered to reach its conclusion, as 
outlined in part 4 above, are by no means exhaustive, complete or binding, but 
rather contribute to future enquiries into the “evolving conversation” about 
the notion of constitutional property.
SUMMARY
This article discusses the court’s approach to the determination of what constitutes property in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”). Property 
that is deemed worthy of constitutional protection is not necessarily limited to the characterisation of 
property in terms of private law. 
The Constitutional Court has provided a number of factors to assist in the determination of what 
should be constitutionally protected in terms of section 25. However, until the decision in Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape (“Shoprite decision”), the courts 
had, for the most part, not yet fully engaged with the meaning of constitutional property that went 
beyond the private-law understanding of property. In this case, the court was called upon to adjudicate 
a query as to whether a commercial trading licence, which permitted the selling of wine in a grocery 
store, fell within the ambit of the meaning of “property” in the Constitution. This case by no means 
provides an expansive and complete definition of what constitutes constitutional property, but, it 
widens the ambit of constitutional property considerably. 
This article argues that the focus of the investigation should be on the rights that are lost when 
determining whether a right should be treated as constitutional property. This article attempts to distil 
the key features used by the court that may be useful for the determination of whether a right falls 
within the notion of constitutional property. 
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